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MISCONDUCT IN WASHINGTON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION LAW-Henson v. Employment Security Department:
113 Wash. 2d 374, 779 P.2d 715 (1989).
Abstract"Unemployment compensation may be denied to employees dismissed for misconduct. In Henson v. Employment Security Department, the Washington Supreme Court
misapplied the misconduct doctrine by blurring the distinction between on-duty and offduty misconduct. This Note compares past Washington misconduct doctrine with its
application in Henson and discusses the potential equal protection implications of this
decision. The author concludes that Henson adversely affects employees and confuses the
misconduct doctrine in Washington. Further, while there was no equal protection violation in Henson, the court's result opens the door to future equal protection challenges and
violations.

The preamble to Washington's unemployment compensation statute
states that unemployment reserves are to be used for the benefit of
persons unemployed through no fault of their own.' The statute provides for the disqualification of an employee from unemployment benefits when an employee has been discharged for misconduct connected
with his or her work.2 While a violation of an employer work rule
may justify the discharge of an employee, such a violation does not
necessarily constitute misconduct for unemployment compensation
purposes.' The analysis of whether unemployment benefits are due to
a discharged employee, therefore, does not hinge upon whether the
employee was rightly or wrongly discharged. The emphasis, rather, is
on whether the employee's actions constituted disqualifying
misconduct.
This Note examines the Washington Supreme Court's application of
the misconduct doctrine in Henson v. Employment Security Department.4 In Henson, the court upheld the denial of benefits to an applicant who was terminated for refusing to attend Alcoholics
Anonymous (AA) meetings.5 The author concludes that the court
misapplied the misconduct doctrine by blurring the distinction
between on-duty and off-duty misconduct and that in so doing, the
court opened the door to potential equal protection challenges and
violations.
1. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.01.010 (1989).
2. Id. § 50.20.060(1) (1989).
3. Ciskie v. Department of Empl. Sec., 35 Wash. App. 72, 76, 664 P.2d 1318, 1320 (1983)
(employee's failure to notify supervisor properly before leaving work was good cause for
discharge but not equated with disqualifying misconduct).
4. 113 Wash. 2d 374, 779 P.2d 715 (1989) (5-4 decision), reconsiderationdenied, Jan. 9, 1990
(order on file with the Washington Law Review).

5. Id. at 376-77, 779 P.2d at 717.
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I.

EMPLOYEE PROTECTION: WASHINGTON
MISCONDUCT LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION

A.

Henson v. Employment Security Department

Henson, a shipping clerk, began working for Tam Engineering Corporation (Tam) in 1966.6 Seventeen years later, in 1983, Tam came to
suspect that Henson had an alcohol abuse problem.7 At Tam's suggestion, Henson went to a hospital for evaluation. 8 The hospital did not
diagnose Henson as an alcoholic, but the hospital director thought
Henson had "an alcohol problem." 9 In 1984, Henson came to work
smelling of alcohol at least six times.1 ° Although Henson never drank
on the job and his job performance was not impaired by his drinking,
Tam decided that the odor of alcohol on Henson was detrimental to
Tam's interests because Henson had contact with customers."'
After six warnings about the odor of alcohol, Tam insisted Henson
attend a twenty-one day alcohol abuse program at Northwest Treatment Center (NTC).' 2 Henson agreed to attend the program to save
his job. 13 In November 1984, NTC released Henson with a diagnosis
of middle-stage alcoholism.1 4 NTC recommended the following aftercare program for Henson: first, that he attend twelve weeks of aftercare group therapy; second, that he return to his home and to work;
and third, that he attend at least three AA meetings per week.1 5 Henson agreed to the first and second parts of the aftercare program, but
refused to attend the AA meetings, which were held in the evenings
during off-work hours.16 When Henson returned to work, Tam
warned him that he would be discharged for refusing to attend AA
6. Id. at 375, 779 P.2d at 716.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 376, 779 P.2d at 716.
11. Id.
12. Id. Tam paid half the costs of the program not covered by Henson's medical insurance.
Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. Middle-stage alcoholism can be characterized by three basic features: physical
dependence as experienced in acute and protracted withdrawal syndromes, craving, and loss of
control. J. MILAM & K. KETCHAM, UNDER THE INFLUENCE 63 (1981).

15. Henson, 113 Wash. 2d at 376, 779 P.2d at 716-17.
16. Id. at 376, 779 P.2d at 717. Henson never agreed to go to Alcoholics Anonymous
meetings. In re Henson, No. 5-02297, at 15 (Empl. Sec. Dep't May 9, 1985) (on file with the
Washington Law Review). Henson felt that AA meetings were useless and would not benefit him.
Id. at 18. Henson had attended AA meetings during the twenty-one day in-patient program at
NTC. Id.
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meetings,' 7 but Henson still refused to go.' 8 This refusal was made on
the job site and during working hours. 9 Tam discharged Henson
because his refusal to attend AA meetings denied Tam assurance that
the treatment program would be fully completed. 20 Without completion of the program, Tam had no guarantee that on-duty drinking
problems would not occur.2 ' Henson then applied for unemployment
benefits.22
The Employment Security Department (ESD) denied Henson's
application for unemployment benefits.2" The trial court and the court
of appeals upheld
the ESD's decision." The Washington Supreme
Court affirmed.25
1.

The Henson Decision and Reasoning

The Washington Supreme Court found that Henson committed onduty misconduct, disqualifying him for unemployment benefits.26
There is no definition of misconduct in the Washington statute. 27
Instead, the court based its analysis on two Washington cases that

established judicial tests for finding disqualifying misconduct. In
Macey v. Department of Employment Security,28 the court formulated
a three-part test for on-duty disqualifying misconduct; 29 in Nelson v.
Department of Employment Security,3 the court formulated a four17. Henson, 113 Wash. 2d at 376, 779 P.2d at 717.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 378, 779 P.2d at 718.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 376, 779 P.2d at 717.
23. The hearing examiner decided that Henson had been discharged for work-connected
misconduct. In re Henson, No. 5-02297, at 38 (Empl. Sec. Dep't May 9, 1985) (on file with the
Washington Law Review). On appeal within the ESD, the administrative law judge upheld the
denial. Id at 56. The ESD Commissioner affirmed. Id. at 84.
24. The Pierce County Superior Court upheld the commissioner's decision. Henson v.
Employment Sec. Dep't, No. 85-2-05924-2 (Super. Ct. Apr. 2, 1987). The Court of Appeals
certified the appeal to the Supreme Court of Washington. Henson, 113 Wash. 2d at 377, 779
P.2d at 717.
25. Henson, 113 Wash. 2d at 377, 779 P.2d at 717.
26. Id at 381, 779 P.2d at 719.
27. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.060(1) (1989).
28. 110 Wash. 2d 308, 752 P.2d 372 (1988).
29. The three prongs of the Macey test are: (1) the employer's rule must be reasonable under
the circumstances, (2) the conduct of the employee must be work-related and must affect the
employee's work performance and the work force in general, and (3) the conduct of the employee
must in fact violate the rule. Id. at 319, 752 P.2d at 378 (because an employee who lied on an
employment application violated a reasonable rule and the act was work-related, it was
diqualifying misconduct).
30. 98 Wash. 2d 370, 655 P.2d 242 (1982).
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part test for determining off-duty disqualifying misconduct.3" The
Macey on-duty test requires only that the employer demonstrate that
the behavior of the employee affected the employee's work. The
employer need not show' harm from the change in work performance.3 2 The Nelson off-duty test requires a more concrete demonstration that the employer was adversely affected.3 3

The majority concluded that Henson's refusal to attend AA meetings during off-duty hours was on-duty misconduct because the refusal
itself occurred on the work site and during working hours.34 Because
the conduct was characterized as on duty, the court applied the less
stringent Macey test.3 The majority began by evaluating whether the
requirement that Henson attend AA meetings was reasonable under
the circumstances, the first prong of the Macey test.36 The majority
found the rule reasonable for four reasons. First, Tam could have
fired Henson earlier for having alcohol on his breath.3 7 Second, Tam
had invested its time and money in Henson's recovery and thus could
expect completion of the entire NTC program, including recommended follow-up treatment.3 8 Third, attendance at AA meetings
would decrease the likelihood of Henson's coming to work with alcohol on his breath.39 Finally, the court concluded that an implied contract between Henson and Tam to attend the AA meetings resulted
when Henson agreed to go to NTC.4
31. The four requirements of the Nelson test are: (1) the employee's misconduct must have
some nexus with the employment, (2) the misconduct must constitute a violation of a rule
reasonably related to the conduct of the employer's business or a code of behavior contracted for
between the employer and employee, (3) the employee must have acted with the intent or
knowledge that the employer's interest would suffer, and (4) the misconduct must actually result
in some harm to the employer's interest. Id. at 375, 655 P.2d at 245 (employee who shoplifted in
off hours and notified employer did not violate any employer rule or regulation and thus did not
commit disqualifying misconduct).
32. Macey, 110 Wash. 2d at 319, 752 P.2d at 378.
33. Nelson, 98 Wash. 2d at 375, 655 P.2d at 245. However, Washington courts have also
found disqualifying misconduct without a showing of employee work impairment or direct
employer harm. These cases involved dismissal for dishonesty, with the dishonesty itself being
considered "per se" harm to the employer. See, e.g., Macey v. Department of Empl. Sec., 110
Wash. 2d 308, 752 P.2d 372 (1988) (employee lied about criminal record on employment
application); Franz v. Department Empl. Sec., 43 Wash. App. 753, 760, 719 P.2d 597, 602 (1986)
(employee rolled back postage meter to cover up poor work performance).
34. Henson v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 113 Wash. 2d 374, 378, 779 P.2d 715, 718 (1989).
35. Id. at 378, 779 P.2d at 718.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 379, 779 P.2d at 718.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 379-80, 779 P.2d at 718.
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The majority then determined that the conduct was related to Henson's employment, thus satisfying the second prong of the Macey
test.4 1 The court noted that to show a sufficient connection, Macey
requires both an effect on the employee's own work performance and
on the work force in general.42 The court acknowledged that Henson's actual work performance was not impaired.4 3 The court found,
however, that Henson's job was affected because Tam would not be
able to trust Henson to deal with the public for fear that alcohol on his
breath would adversely affect customer relations,' and because
another employee would therefore have to be hired to perform Henson's duties.4 5 The majority also found that Henson's refusal to attend
AA meetings would affect the work force in general, stating that "it is
within the legitimate interests and expectations of an employer that all
employees come to work without smelling of alcohol." 4 6
Finally, the majority found that an employer rule was broken when
Henson refused to go to AA meetings as required by Tam, thus satisfying the third prong of the Macey test.4 7 Having determined that
Henson's conduct occurred on duty, and that all three prongs of the
Macey on-duty test were met, the majority found that Henson committed misconduct that disqualified him from unemployment compensation benefits.4"
2. The Dissenting Opinion's Interpretationof Misconduct
Judge Durham dissented,4 9 asserting that there was no legal basis
for the majority's finding of disqualifying misconduct.50 The crux of
the dissent was that there was never a showing, as required in all previous Washington misconduct cases, that Henson's refusal to attend
AA meetings had a significant adverse effect on his employer.5 The
41. Id. at 380, 779 P.2d at 719.

42. Id.
43. Id. Henson's supervisor testified that he did not think that Henson's drinking affected his
work performance. In re Henson, No. 5-02297, at 31 (Empl. Sec. Dep't May 9, 1985) (on file
with the Washington Law Review).
44. Henson, 113 Wash. 2d at 380, 779 P.2d at 719.
45. Id. at 380-81, 779 P.2d at 719.
46. Id. at 381, 779 P.2d at 719.

47. Id.
48. Judges Utter, Pearson, Andersen, and Smith concurred with Judge Dolliver's majority

opinion. Id.
49. Callow, C.J., and Judges Brachtenbach and Dore concurred. Id. at 387, 779 P.2d at 722.
50. Id. at 381, 779 P.2d at 719 (Durham, J., dissenting).
dissenting). Note, however, that in Macey there
51. Id.at 383, 779 P.2d at 720 (Durham, J.,
was no direct harm to the employer when the employee lied about his criminal record- the
harm was implied. Macey v. Department of Empl. Sec., 110 Wash. 2d 308, 321, 752 P.2d 372,

379 (1988).
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dissent did not distinguish between on-duty and off-duty misconduct,
but rather indicated that a showing of harm to the employer is necessary in any case of disqualifying misconduct. 5 2 The dissent also cited
several ESD decisions for this proposition, some involving alcohol
treatment.5 3 In all cases where misconduct was found, there was a
current, not potential, adverse effect on the employer.5 4 The dissent
therefore concluded that the decision to deny benefits was unfair and
55
that the ESD's decision should be reversed.
B.

Equal Protection Analysis of Denying Unemployment Benefits

Although the issue was not raised in Henson, the ESD's denial of
Henson's application for benefits implicates the equal protection
clause. 56 Henson could have argued that he had a fundamental right
to refuse to attend AA meetings, and that when the ESD rejected his
application for benefits because of his refusal, it denied him equal
protection.57
The fourteenth amendment provides that "[no] state shall make or
enforce any law which shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 58 Equality can be denied when
52. Henson, 113 Wash. 2d at 383, 779 P.2d at 720 (Durham, J., dissenting). The dissent
acknowledged that employees who come to work with alcohol on their breath may be required to
seek necessary and effective treatment. The ESD ruled that requiring employees to enter
treatment when they had alcohol-related work absences was reasonable as a condition of
continued employment. In re Garcia, 422 Wash. Empl. See. Comm'r Dec. 5 (1978). The dissent
noted that Henson received treatment by completing the twenty-one day in-patient treatment
program and agreeing to attend twelve weekly group meetings as part of the aftercare program.
Henson, 113 Wash. 2d at 386, 779 P.2d at 721 (Durham, J., dissenting). There was no evidence
that Henson had alcohol on his breath after treatment. In Judge Durham's opinion, a failure to
attend recommended AA meetings did not establish that the employer would be adversely
affected. Id. at 387, 779 P.2d at 722 (Durham, J.,
dissenting).
53. Id. at 385-86, 779 P.2d at 721 (Durham, J.,
dissenting) (citing In re Purcell, Wash. Empl.
Sec. Comm'r. Dec. 540 (1979) (employee's violation of agreement to abstain from drinking
alcohol off the job was not misconduct because there was no direct harm to employer)); In re
Garcia, Wash. Empl. Sec. Comm'r Dec. 422 (1978) (failure to attend an alcohol treatment
program as a condition of continued employment is misconduct because the employer suffered
harm from alcohol-related work absences).
54. Henson, 113 Wash. 2d at 384-85, 779 P.2d at 720-21 (Durham, J.,dissenting).
55. Id. at 387, 779 P.2d at 722 (Durham, J.,dissenting).
56. The Washington Supreme Court has applied equal protection analysis to several
unemployment compensation cases. See Toulou v. Department of Social & Health Servs., 27
Wash. App. 137, 616 P.2d 678 (1980); Davis v. Department of Empl. Sec., 108 Wash. 2d 272,
737 P.2d 1262 (1987).
57. Henson is not an entitlement case. The entitlement doctrine applies only to cases where
the plaintiff has already qualified for and received benefits, and then the benefits are terminated.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Henson never qualified for benefits, and is thus
precluded from any entitlement protection, which would require certain procedural due process.
58. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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the government classifies "so as to distinguish, in its rules or programs, between persons who should be regarded as similarly situated." 9 Courts apply strict scrutiny to these classifications if the
challenged state law is disadvantageous to some suspect class or
impinges on a constitutionally protected fundamental right.' If
neither of these two criteria is present, then the rational basis test is
applied.61
L

Strict Scrutiny for Denying Unemployment Benefits

Under the strict scrutiny test, a challenged law will be upheld only if
it is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest.62 The
courts apply strict scrutiny to any challenged statute that is based
upon a suspect classification. 63 A classification is suspect if it gives
distinct treatment to a group that has historically been the victim of
discrimination."4 Race and national origin are two classifications that
are considered suspect. 5
a. Strict Scrutiny for Burdens on FundamentalRights
If a statute burdens the exercise of a fundamental right, strict scrutiny is also applied. 6 A fundamental right is a right explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.67 The United States
Supreme Court has defined several fundamental rights,68 including
fundamental rights derived from the right to privacy.6 9 Each of these
rights can invoke equal protection.7" The United States Supreme
59. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1438 (2d ed. 1988).

60. Id. at 1451.
61. Id. at 1439-43.

62. Id. at 1452 n.4.
63. Ird.
at 1451.
64. Id. at 1465.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1451.

67. Id. at 1458.
68. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). The right to interstate
travel, the right to speak, and the right to vote are protected fundamental rights. Id. at 32, 36.
The right to education, housing, and food are not fundamental rights. Id. at 33, 35.
69. The right to privacy encompasses rights or matters relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, childrearing and education. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
600 n.26 (1976).
70. L. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 1451.
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Court has held that the freedom to control one's own body 71 and to
care for one's health and person 72 are fundamental rights.
In Bedford v. Sugarman,7 3 the Washington Supreme Court adopted
the United States Supreme Court's definitions of fundamental rights
derived from the right to privacy.7 4 Washington courts have also
identified a fundamental right to make certain medical decisions,
which is similar to the federal right to control one's own body. In In
re Colyer,75 the Washington Supreme Court granted a terminally ill
adult patient the right to refuse medical treatment that only served to
prolong the dying process.76 The court in Colyer reasoned that the
right to privacy extends to such a health-care decision. 77 The Washington Supreme Court subsequently reaffirmed the fundamental right
of competent adults to determine the type of medical treatment they
will receive.78 In In re Schuoler, the court held that the constitutional
right to privacy encompasses the right to choose one type of medical
treatment over another, or to refuse treatment altogether. 79 The court
also recognized the right to refuse medical treatment in In re
Ingram.8 0 There, the court held that, unless outweighed by some state
interest, a person has the right to make personal medical decisions.
b.

Funding Constraints as Burdens on FundamentalRights

Even when a fundamental right exists, government funding need not
be allocated equally to avoid infringing on the exercise of that right.
Unequal funding does not necessarily trigger strict scrutiny of a statute under an equal protection analysis. For example, in Maher v.
Roe,8 the United States Supreme Court recognized the fundamental
71. "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded ... than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference
of others .... " Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (plaintiff need not
submit to medical examination against her will to substantiate tort claim). But see Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (certain important state interests, such as mandatory vaccinations for
citizens, may limit the fundamental right to control one's own medical decisions).
72. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973).
73. 112 Wash. 2d 500, 772 P.2d 486 (1989).
74. Id. at 513, 772 P.2d at 493 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 n.26 (1977)); see
supra note 69.
75. 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
76. Id. at 138-39, 660 P.2d at 751.
77. Id. at 120, 660 P.2d at 742.
78. In re Schuoler, 106 Wash. 2d 500, 506, 723 P.2d 1103, 1107 (1986).
79. Id. at 507, 723 P.2d at 1108.
80. 102 Wash. 2d 827, 836, 689 P.2d 1363, 1368 (1984) (a patient's preference for radiation
treatment over surgery had to be followed because it was not a life and death choice and thus the
state's interest in preserving life did not prevail).
81. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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right to abortion, but held that a state is not required to fund abortions.82 This holding rested on the Court's determination that states
are free to make value judgments regarding the exercise of fundamental rights through the allocation of public funds, so long as there is a
rational basis for the funding.83 Thus, a state regulation that funded
childbirth expenses for indigent women but not abortion expenses did
not amount to a burden on a fundamental right.84
While courts ordinarily allow legislatures to allocate public funds as
they see fit, the Court has drawn a line beyond which legislative allocation of funds violates the equal protection guarantee. In Shapiro v.
Thompson,85 the United States Supreme Court held that a welfare program's durational residence requirements for the receipt of public benefits were unconstitutional."6 The Court held that the program
in Shapiro violated the equal protection clause by unjustifiably burdening the fundamental right to travel freely among the states.8 7 Thus
while most government program eligibility requirements are upheld, if
they burden a fundamental right, the programs may be found
unconstitutional.
Just as federal courts have allowed legislatures to influence the exercise of fundamental rights through resource allocation, so too have
Washington courts. In Bedford v. Sugarman, s the Washington
Supreme Court relied on reasoning similar to that in Maher. The Bedford court upheld a shelter assistance and drug treatment program
requiring indigent alcoholics and drug abusers to move into designated
shelters to become eligible for the program's benefits.8 9 The court
noted that even if the shelter applicants had a fundamental right at
82. Id. at 469.
83. Id. at 474.
84. Id. at 469-70.
85. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
86. Id. at 619, 627.
87. Id. at 619, 629-31. The Court in Maher distinguished Shapiro because the statute in
Maher did not directly penalize those who exercised a fundamental right, as did the statute in
Shapiro. Maher,432 U.S. at 474-75 n.8. The Court stated that the denial of welfare benefits to
one who had recently exercised the right to travel across state lines, as found in Shapiro, was
sufficiently analogous to a criminal fine to justify strict judicial scrutiny. Id. The Court reasoned
that if the program in Maher had denied general welfare benefits to all women who had obtained
abortions and who were otherwise entitled to benefits, then it also would have justified strict
scrutiny. Id As a result, the Court found that there was no support in the right-to-travel cases
for the view that the state in Maher must have shown a compelling interest for its decision not to
fund elective abortions. Id. The Court seemingly viewed the statute in Shapiro as a direct
penalty but viewed the statute in Maher as merely an indirect impact resulting from a legitimate
classification.
88. 112 Wash. 2d 500, 772 P.2d 486 (1989).
89. Id. at 501, 772 P.2d at 487.
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stake, 90 the program involved only a financial incentive and not a
direct governmental restraint on choices. The court found that the
financial incentive did not sufficiently burden any fundamental right
and therefore did not trigger strict scrutiny. 9 1 The court also noted
that in the area of social legislation, the government must be given
broad latitude to experiment with possible solutions to social
problems.92
2. RationalBasis for Denying Unemployment Benefits
If a statute does not involve a suspect class and does not burden a
fundamental right, the standard of judicial review is the "rational
basis" test. The federal rational basis test requires
only that a state
93
law rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose.
The Washington Supreme Court has developed a three-step inquiry
to test for an equal protection violation under the rational basis test. 94
The first step questions whether the classification applies alike to all
members within the designated class. The second step questions
whether some basis in reality exists for reasonably distinguishing
between those within and without the designated class. The third step
questions whether the challenged classification has any rational relation to the purposes of the challenged statute.95
II.

HENSON v. ESD: ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS

A.

The Henson Court Misapplied the Washington Misconduct
Doctrine

1. The Court Should Not Have Applied the On-duty Test
The Henson court's classification of Henson's refusal to attend AA
meeting as on-duty conduct 96 was fundamentally flawed. The court
found that the conduct occurred while Henson was on duty because
Henson's refusal to attend the meetings took place on the job site and
during working hours. 97 The court should have classified Henson's
90. The court found that the fundamental right to autonomy did not extend to the shelter
applicants' choice of where to live. The right of autonomy is derived from the right of privacy.
Id. at 513-14, 772 P.2d at 493 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 n.26 (1976)); see supra
note 69.
91. Bedford, 112 Wash. 2d at 514-15, 772 P.2d at 494.
92. Id. at 508, 772 P.2d at 490.
93. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470 (1977).
94. Conklin v. Shinpoch, 107 Wash. 2d 410, 418, 730 P.2d 643, 648 (1986).
95. Id.
96. Henson v. Employment See. Dep't, 113 Wash. 2d 374, 378, 779 P.2d 715, 718 (1989).
97. Id.
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conduct as off duty. The AA meetings were held during off-duty
hours and off the job site. The court confused the refusal with the
conduct itself. This raises the question how the court would have categorized Henson's conduct if Henson had telephoned his refusal, made
the refusal minutes after working hours ended, or sent a letter to his
employer explaining his refusal. The effect of such refusals would be
the same as Henson's on-the-job refusal. However, characterizing
these other refusals as on duty would distort the distinction between
on duty and off duty beyond applicability.
Henson's misconduct was not sufficiently work-related to justify the
application of the on-duty test, because the only element of Henson's
conduct that was on duty was his refusal.9 8 Evaluating where and
when Henson Made the refusal evades the real issue: whether the failure to attend AA meetings was sufficiently connected with his work to
deny him benefits. The appropriate test was the Nelson off-duty test,
because the AA meetings were not sufficiently connected with Henson's work to justify an on-duty analysis.9 9 The AA meetings were
held during Henson's off-hours and off the work site. By ignoring
these factors and focusing on Henson's on-duty refusal, the court significantly and unjustifiably expanded what qualifies as on-duty
misconduct.
The distinction between on-duty and off-duty conduct is significant
because the two standards require an employer to show different
degrees of impact from the employee's conduct in order to prove misconduct. °" Under the on-duty test, the employer need only show
employee work-impairment, whereas under the off-duty test the
employer must show actual harm to the employer.101
The employer was not required to show actual harm in Henson.
Following Henson's completion of the twenty-one day residential program at NTC, no evidence existed showing that Henson had continuing alcohol problems. 0 2 Tam could only speculate about potential
harms that might result from Henson not attending AA. Tam
presented no evidence regarding the likelihood that the potential harm
would occur. Had the court properly characterized Henson's refusal

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
Henson, 113 Wash. 2d at 387, 779 P.2d at 722.
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to attend AA as off-duty misconduct, the showing of harm to Tam
that the off-duty test requires would not have been sustained.103
2.

The Macey On-duty Test Was Not Met

Even if the Henson court's application of the on-duty test was
appropriate, the court misapplied the Macey on-duty test and thereby
compounded the confusion surrounding the misconduct doctrine. The
Macey test requires that the employee's conduct have an effect on the
employee's work performance in particular and on the work force in
general."°4 The court did not require such a showing in Henson, but
instead referred to an amorphous general impairment of Henson's
work performance that would allegedly result from Henson's refusal
to attend AA meetings. 105 The court apparently concluded that the
Macey test was met by a prediction of such general harm. Under the
court's own assessment of the facts of the case, however, the Macey
test was not met because no specific impairment of Henson's work
performance was found.10 6 As a result of the court's dilution of its onduty test, the degree of impairment that will satisfy the on-duty test is
uncertain. 1o7
3.

Henson Altered the Misconduct Test

Henson leaves no clear misconduct test to be applied in future cases.
It does, however, provide precedent for finding misconduct when an
employee breaks a rule and the employer predicts future harm to the
business that could result from that violation. The court ignored the
substantial difference between actual harm to an employer and potential harm.
103. This result is supported by In re Garcia. Wash. Empl. Sec. Comm'r Dec. 422 (1978); see
supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. In Garcia, the refusal to attend an alcohol treatment
program was properly characterized as off-duty misconduct. Id. In Garcia, however, the
employer was able to show direct harm from the employee's alcohol related absences, and thus
the off-duty misconduct test was met. Id.
104. Macey v. Department of Empl. Sec., 110 Wash. 2d 308, 319, 752 P.2d 372, 378 (1988).
105. The court found Henson's usefulness to the company affected by the employer's
uncertainty about Henson's future conduct and the employer's need to have another employee
temporarily perform Henson's public duties. Henson, 113 Wash. 2d at 380-81, 779 P.2d at 719.
106. Id. at 380, 779 P.2d at 719.
107. The dissent also misinterpreted the Macey misconduct doctrine. See supra note 52. The
dissent proposed the rule that all misconduct cases must show a significant adverse effect on the
employer. Henson, 113 Wash. 2d. at 383, 779 P.2d at 720 (Durham, J., dissenting). There was,
in fact, no direct employer harm in Macey. Macey, 110 Wash. 2d at 321, 752 P.2d at 379. The
dissent apparently would blur or possibly dissolve the distinction between Macey and Nelson by
requiring employer harm in both on-duty and off-duty misconduct cases.
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a. Henson Leaves Misconduct Standards Unclear
Henson offers conflicting standards as to what is off-duty or on-duty
conduct, and what degree of harm to the employer must be shown.
Henson broadened the circumstances in which the on-duty standard is
applied and lessened the degree of work performance impairment
needed to show misconduct.,o 8 The result is a blurring of the distinction between the Macey on-duty and Nelson off-duty misconduct tests.
The practical significance of this confusion will be increased litigation
involving ESD disqualifications for breach of employer rules until a
more workable standard is established. 1 9 This will, of course, be
costly to employees, employers, and the state. Employees will face
long waits for unemployment benefits. Employers will continuously
have to revise office procedures and respond to litigation. The state
will have to absorb the cost of increased litigation and administrative
and judicial appeals resulting from the confusion in Henson.
b. Lifestyle Choices Remain Unprotected
Under Henson, off-duty activities and lifestyle choices other than
drinking or attending AA meetings are also vulnerable to invasion by
employers. Employees' off-duty behavior no longer must have a tangible negative impact on the employer before employees can be disqualified for misconduct. " 0° An employer could make a rule, inform the
employee of the rule, and speculate about possible future harm to the
business that could result from the rule's violation. Then, if the
employee broke the rule, the employee could be dismissed for misconduct and would be ineligible for unemployment benefits.1 11 For example, an employer could make a rule that all employees must abstain
from smoking, even in their off hours, based on speculation that smokers will be less productive workers. An employee caught smoking
while off duty, or one who refused to agree not to smoke, could be
fired and denied unemployment benefits.112 Classifying such a refusal
as misconduct stretches the rational relationship between a miscon108. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
109. A possible solution to the problems posed by Henson would be for the state legislature to
pass legislation, or for the ESD to pass regulations, defining disqualifying misconduct by
codifying the Macey and Nelson tests.
110. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
I 11. Employer actions would, however, be limited by existing protective statutes, such as the
federal civil rights laws.
112. Similar results could occur in cases of employees who gamble or have unmarried live-in
partners. These lifestyle choices are left unprotected by Henson.
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duct finding and denying unemployment benefits to those unemployed
through no fault of their own.I13
Intrusions by employers into the private lives of employees, like the
intrusion in Henson, are unwarranted. Employers have a greater right
to dictate employee behavior during the hours for which employees
are paid than they do during unpaid hours. When the behavior at
issue occurs during paid hours, the Macey on-duty test should apply,
with its less stringent requirement of impairment. During unpaid
hours, however, the Nelson off-duty test should apply, with its more
burdensome requirement of showing substantial harm to the
employer. An employee's decisions about behavior during unpaid
hours, even though made during paid hours, as in Henson, should be
governed by the Nelson off-duty test.114
c.

Henson May Deter Alcohol Related Misconduct

A positive effect of Henson is that employees will be encouraged to
follow through with alcohol treatment suggested by their employers,
because a failure to do so may result in a denial of unemployment
benefits. Alcohol abuse is estimated to cost the American economy
$65 billion a year in lost productivity." 5 Absenteeism among problem
drinkers is 8.3 times greater than among other employees.1 16 Further,
almost forty percent of industrial fatalities and forty-seven percent of
industrial injuries are linked to alcohol abuse. 1 7 A result of Henson is
that unemployment benefits are distributed to those who are making
an attempt to deal with alcohol abuse by participating fully in treatment programs. Thus, Henson helps decrease costs associated with
113. See infra notes 118-43 and accompanying text for the equal protection implications of
unemployment classifications.
114. The ESD cannot disregard a decision of the Washington Supreme Court, but the ESD
has limited its application of Henson to avoid invading other personal decisions. Currently the
ESD is assuming that Henson is limited to cases of drug and alcohol treatment unless the court
holds otherwise. Interview with Norm Erickson, Washington ESD Commissioner's Review
Office (Feb. 6, 1990) (notes on file with the Washington Law Review). The ESD has chosen to
limit the application of Henson because otherwise the ESD would be in the position of finding a
violation of virtually any employer rule to be disqualifying misconduct, a proposition with
implications the ESD did not want to adopt. Id. Relying on an ESD administrative policy that
is subject to change at the whim of the ESD, however, does not offer sufficient safeguards to
employees under the unemployment compensation program. The Henson decision remains a
threat to employees' individual rights.
115. BNA SPECIAL REPORT, ALCOHOL AND DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE: COSTS,
CONTROLS, AND CONTROVERSIES 8 (1986).
116. T. DENENBERG & R.V. DENENBERG,
WORKPLACE 5 (1983).

117. Id. at7.
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alcohol abuse by encouraging treatment and funnels public monies to
those who minimize long term costs by getting treatment.
B.

Result of Applying Equal Protection Analysis to Henson

Although the court did not consider the issue, Henson implicates
the equal protection clause. Equal protection challenges have been
made in similar Washington unemployment classification cases and in
federal cases.1 1 While there was probably no equal protection violation in Henson, the court's misapplication of the misconduct doctrine
opens the door for the statute to be challenged on equal protection
grounds in future cases. In view of the potential expansion of Henson
to other important rights, courts should be sensitive to intrusions that
are not rationally related to the ESD's goal of granting benefits to
those unemployed through no fault of their own.
Had the court applied an equal protection analysis, Henson would
not have qualified for strict scrutiny 1 9 because there was not a sufficient burden on a fundamental right. Further, under the rational basis
test the ESD denial of benefits would stand. Equal protection analysis
does show, however, that while Henson did not have a right to funding, he did have a fundamental right to refuse to attend AA meetings.
1.

FundamentalRight at Stake in Henson

Henson could have argued that he had a fundamental right to
choose not to attend AA meetings. Henson could have claimed that
AA meetings constituted treatment for the disease of alcoholism, and
therefore his refusal to attend AA meetings was the exercise of a fundamental right to make a medical care decision. Individuals have the
right to exercise control over their bodies and health.120 The right to
make medical care decisions is a logical extension of that right. Therefore, Henson had the right to decide whether or not to attend AA
meetings.
Henson also had a fundamental right to refuse to attend AA meetings under Washington law. The Washington Supreme Court has
acknowledged a fundamental right to make decisions about one's own
medical treatment. 1 ' The Washington Supreme Court has also indi118. See supra note 56, notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
119. Henson did not claim that his racial identity or ethnic background was the basis for the
ESD's decision; thus the court would not apply strict scrutiny based on a suspect classification.
120. See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
121. See In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 120, 660 P.2d 738, 742 (1983); supra notes 75-77 and
accompanying text.
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cated that competent adults have a right to determine the type of medical treatment they will receive. 122 Henson could have argued that he
should have been extended the same right to determine how he wished
to deal with alcoholism. As part of his medical treatment, Henson
chose to attend the twenty-one-day in-treatment program. He chose
not to attend the AA meetings. This determination is essentially a
health care decision and thus is protected as the exercise of a fundamental right.
2. Denial of Funding in Henson Is Not a Burden on a
FundamentalRight
Henson's refusal to attend AA meetings was a protected fundamental right, but the state's denial of unemployment benefits based on
Henson's refusal did not require strict scrutiny, and did not violate the
equal protection clause. The denial of funding in Henson is similar to
the denial of funding in Maher. As the court in Maher noted, even
when a fundamental right exists, there is no requirement that equal
government funding must be allocated to avoid infringing on the exercise of that right. 123 While the Maher court recognized a fundamental
right to abortion, it held that a state is free to make value judgments
regarding the exercise of this fundamental right through its allocation
of public funds.1 24 Similarly, although the ESD could recognize Henson's right to make medical decisions regarding the treatment of alcoholism, it would not be required to pay Henson unemployment
benefits if he chose not to complete treatment.
In Shapiro v. Thompson, 2 5 however, the Supreme Court found that
the denial of public funds burdened a fundamental right such that
strict scrutiny was required. 2 6 While the court in Maher distin27
guished Shapiro because of the direct penalty effect of the statute,1
another aspect distinguishes Maher and Shapiro more clearly still.
The statute in Shapiro was held unconstitutional because the Court
found the statute purposely burdened a fundamental right. 2 The
Shapiro court found no compelling justification to deny families wel122. In re Schuoler, 106 Wash. 2d 500, 506, 723 P.2d 1103, 1107 (1986); In re Ingram, 102
Wash. 2d 827, 689 P.2d 1363 (1984); see supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 81-84.
124. Maher v Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
125. 394 U.S. 618 (1969); see supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (discussing Shapiro).
126. The program burdened the right to interstate travel. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638.
127. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474-75 n.8.
128. "[T]he purpose of inhibiting migration by needy persons into the state is constitutionally
impermissible." Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629.
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fare aid solely because they had been residents for less than a year. 12 1
The Court held that because the statute impermissibly deterred interstate travel, the statute triggered strict scrutiny. Conversely, the purpose of the statute at issue in Maher was to promote childbirth, not to
burden the right to abortion.13 0 Failing to fund abortions was merely
131
a side effect of applying that statute.
When this analysis is applied to Henson, it appears there was no
burden on a fundamental right. The purpose of the statute in Henson
was not to burden health care decisions, but rather to distribute benefits to those unemployed through no fault of their own. As in Maher,
the financial impact on Henson was merely an unfortunate side effect
of applying the statute and not a direct punishment for the exercise of
a fundamental right. Therefore strict scrutiny would not apply.
The denial of funding to Henson also did not burden a fundamental
right under Washington law. Henson's decision to refuse treatment
for alcoholism through AA is analogous to the situation in Bedford v.
Sugarman.132 In both Henson and Bedford, the plaintiffs had to comply with certain standards in order to qualify for public funds. 133 The
Bedford court found that a requirement that the plaintiffs live in shelters did not infringe on their ability to make crucial decisions about
fundamental rights. 1 34 Significant to this finding was the fact that the
1 35
restraint on the plaintiffs was financial in nature.
Similarly, when the ESD denied Henson's application for unemployment benefits, it merely required him to abide by the legislative
qualifications to receive benefits. This did not infringe on his ability to
make crucial decisions about fundamental rights. Despite the financial
burden of not receiving benefits, Henson still retained the freedom to
refuse to attend AA meetings. There was no governmental restriction
on his choice. Nobody forced him to attend AA meetings. Under
Bedford, a financial restraint of this type does not trigger strict
scrutiny.
129. Id. at 627.
130. Maher, 432 U.S. at 478-79.
131. Id. at 474; see supra note 87.
132. 112 Wash. 2d 500, 772 P.2d 486 (1989); see supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text
(discussing Bedford).
133. Id. at 502-03, 772 P.2d at 487; Henson v. Employment See. Dep't, 113 Wash. 2d 374,
376, 779 P.2d 715, 719 (1989).
134. Bedford, 112 Wash. 2d at 515-16, 772 P.2d at 494.
135. "Any restraints [plaintiffs] may feel on their freedom to make this choice are of a
financial, not governmental, nature, and thus are not a constitutional concern." Id. at 515, 772
P.2d at 494 (comparing to Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1980)).
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This distinction is also supported by other Washington cases. A
Washington appellate court held that there is no requirement that persons involved with welfare cannot, consistent with the equal protection clause of the Constitution, be treated differently depending upon
their status at a given time. 13 6 The Washington Supreme Court has
also held that decisions regarding allocations of public funds should be
given deference, and that "statutory discrimination in public welfare
programs will be upheld if any state of facts reasonably may be con13 7
ceived to justify it."
3. ESD's Denial of Benefits Meets the Rational Basis Test
Since Henson did not trigger strict scrutiny, the rational basis test
would have been applied in an equal protection challenge to the ESD's
decision. 3 Under both the federal and Washington rational basis
tests, courts ask: (1) whether the legislature has a legitimate interest,
and (2) whether the law or regulation rationally furthers that interest. 139 Henson meets the constitutional requirements. There was both
a permissible purpose and a rational basis to exclude Henson from
unemployment compensation benefits.
The legislature may make value decisions that affect funding levels
for different groups so long as classifications are made for a permissible purpose. The Washington State legislature has clearly identified
the purpose of unemployment benefits. Benefits are to be disbursed to
protect those unemployed through no fault of their own. Just as the
legislative purpose in Maher was to promote childbirth," 4 the Washington legislature chose to allocate public funds to promote a public
value. Henson supports the legislature's intent to restrict unemploy136. Toulou v. Social & Health Servs., 27 Wash. App. 137, 146, 616 P.2d 678, 683 (1980) (a
public assistance recipient who received outside income was not entitled to benefits, even when
outside income was used to pay outstanding debts).
137. Davis v. Department of Empl. Sec., 108 Wash. 2d 272, 280, 737 P.2d 1262, 1267 (1987)
(no equal protection violation occurred when unemployment benefits were denied to an applicant
who quit her job to relocate to live in a meretricious relationship, even though benefits were
awarded to applicants who quit jobs to live in marital relationships).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
139. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470 (1977) (quoting San Antonio School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)). The first element of the Washington rational basis test-does
the classification apply alike to all members within the designated class-is implicit in the federal
rational basis test. See L. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 1438-40. The second element of the
Washington test-the existence of a basis in reality for the classification-focuses on whether
there is a reasonable basis for making the classification. This is equivalent to the federal
requirement that the classification be legitimate. Davis v. Department of Employment Sec., 108
Wash. 2d 272, 280, 737 P.2d 1262, 1267 (1987).
140. Maher, 432 U.S. at 478.
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ment compensation to applicants who are not at fault for their

unemployment.
The denial of benefits to those who refuse alcoholism treatment
rationally furthers the state's legitimate interest in awarding benefits to
those not at fault for their unemployment. Henson could rationally be
determined to be at fault because he deliberately refused to attend AA
meetings when the employer had several interests in requiring him to
attend. 141 Because the nexus between the classification and state purpose need not be great under the rational basis test,14 2 the ESD's classification in Henson meets the constitutional requirements.1 43
III.

CONCLUSION

The Washington Supreme Court misapplied the misconduct doctrine in Henson. The court abandoned the previous misconduct doctrine in order to deny Henson unemployment benefits. The previous
distinction between on-duty and off-duty misconduct should be readopted to reflect the different duties an employee owes to an
employer during paid and unpaid hours.
While the injury to Henson was not an equal protection violation,
the court's decision leaves employees vulnerable to unwarranted intru141. The court put special emphasis on the interest of the employer (rather than the state) in
finding that Henson was not entitled to benefits because: (1) if an employer pays for an
employee's recovery program, the employer is entitled to expect the employee to follow through;
(2) employers do not have to wait until a customer complains about the odor of alcohol to
dismiss an employee for misconduct; (3) an employee who makes an oral contract with the
employer to undergo alcohol treatment is not entitled to unilaterally breach the contract; and (4)
it is within the legitimate interests and expectations of an employer that all employees come to
work without smelling of alcohol. Henson v. Employment See. Dep't, 113 Wash. 2d 374,
379-81, 779 P.2d 715, 718-19 (1989).
142. L. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 1443.
143. This result is similar to that reached in Maherand Davis. In Maher, 432 U.S. at 478, the
Supreme Court found that denying funding for abortions rationally furthered the state's interest
in encouraging normal childbirth. Id. Similarly, the denial of benefits to Henson due to his
refusal to attend AA meetings furthered the state's interest in denying unemployment benefits to
those who are at fault. The Washington Supreme Court permitted the ESD to deny
unemployment benefits to those quitting their jobs because they chose to relocate to live in
meretricious relationships, but to award benefits to those quitting their jobs to relocate to live in
marital relationships. Davis v. Department EmpI. Sec., 108 Wash. 2d 272, 280, 737 P.2d 1262,
1267 (1987); see supra notes 56, 137. The court in Davis found that the legislature had a
legitimate purpose in promoting the stability of the family unit, and accepted the ESD's view that
those who quit work to live in a meretricious relationship do not have a serious commitment to
the family unit. Davis, 108 Wash. 2d at 280, 737 P.2d at 1267. Thus the classification was
rationally related to the state interest in stable family units. Id. at 281, 737 P.2d at 1267.
Similarly, the classification of Henson's refusal to attend AA meetings as misconduct is
rationally related to the state's interest in denying benefits to those at fault for their
unemployment.
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sions into their private lives by employers and may therefore lead to
future equal protection challenges and violations. To avoid unwarranted intrusions, courts deciding such cases should be sensitive to
equal protection issues. Unwarranted intrusions would also be
avoided if the Washington Supreme Court refashions the misconduct
doctrine so that it offers protection to employees and clear guidelines
to employers. After Henson, the doctrine does neither.
Karen L. Forner
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